Research on the collaborative mechanism of a data trading market based on a four-party evolutionary game in the context of digital intelligence

IF 6.2 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Yue Li , Guofu Li , Anfeng Xu , Fengmin Yao
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper aims to investigate how the strategic choices of regulatory agencies,transformation enterprises, data suppliers, and data trading platforms influence the vitality of the data trading market in the digital intelligence era, addressing existing challenges such as insufficient compliance and supply-demand mismatches. By integrating evolutionary game theory with system dynamics, this study constructs a four-party evolutionary game model for regulatory agencies, enterprises, data suppliers and trading platforms, and a simulation analysis was performed on the evolution path of the market equilibrium state caused by changes in key factors. The results indicate that: (1) a significant positive feedback mechanism exists between stringent regulation and active compliance by data suppliers, effectively alleviating compliance inadequacies; likewise, enterprise digital transformation and platform intelligent services also demonstrate significant positive feedback, contributing to resolving supply-demand mismatches. (2) Measures including enhanced regulatory benefits, reduced regulatory costs, increased benefits and reduced costs of enterprise digital transformation, and lowered platform intelligent upgrading costs collectively drive the market toward an ideal equilibrium (characterized by stringent regulation, active compliance, digital transformation, and intelligent services). Conversely, unfavorable conditions lead to a non-ideal equilibrium state, characterized by decreased compliance, reduced market participation, and lower efficiency.
数字智能背景下基于四方演化博弈的数据交易市场协同机制研究
本文旨在探讨数字智能时代监管机构、转型企业、数据供应商和数据交易平台的战略选择如何影响数据交易市场的活力,解决当前存在的合规性不足和供需不匹配等挑战。本文将进化博弈论与系统动力学相结合,构建了监管机构、企业、数据供应商和交易平台的四方进化博弈模型,并对关键因素变化导致的市场均衡状态演化路径进行了仿真分析。结果表明:(1)严格监管与数据供应商主动合规之间存在显著的正反馈机制,有效缓解了合规不足;同样,企业数字化转型和平台智能服务也表现出显著的正反馈,有助于解决供需不匹配问题。(2)提高监管效益、降低监管成本、提高企业数字化转型效益、降低企业数字化转型成本、降低平台智能升级成本等措施,共同推动市场向严格监管、积极合规、数字化转型、智能服务的理想均衡方向发展。相反,不利条件导致非理想均衡状态,其特征是依从性降低,市场参与度降低,效率降低。
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来源期刊
Socio-economic Planning Sciences
Socio-economic Planning Sciences OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE-
CiteScore
9.40
自引率
13.10%
发文量
294
审稿时长
58 days
期刊介绍: Studies directed toward the more effective utilization of existing resources, e.g. mathematical programming models of health care delivery systems with relevance to more effective program design; systems analysis of fire outbreaks and its relevance to the location of fire stations; statistical analysis of the efficiency of a developing country economy or industry. Studies relating to the interaction of various segments of society and technology, e.g. the effects of government health policies on the utilization and design of hospital facilities; the relationship between housing density and the demands on public transportation or other service facilities: patterns and implications of urban development and air or water pollution. Studies devoted to the anticipations of and response to future needs for social, health and other human services, e.g. the relationship between industrial growth and the development of educational resources in affected areas; investigation of future demands for material and child health resources in a developing country; design of effective recycling in an urban setting.
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