Enhancing Spreading Code Authentication in GNSS: A Statistical Multisignal Approach

Francesco Ardizzon;Laura Crosara;Stefano Tomasin;Nicola Laurenti
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Abstract

The threat of signal spoofing against global navigation satellite system has grown in recent years and has motivated the study of antispoofing techniques. This article addresses the challenge of verifying the authenticity of signals protected by spreading code authentication. Conventional methods rely on either the correlation or cross-energy checks between the received signal and a local replica of the transmitted signal generated by the verifier using the authentic code. However, these methods are vulnerable to specific attacks. In particular, we show how to forge an effective spoofing signal just by using publicly available information. As a countermeasure, we propose a two-step authentication protocol leveraging the statistical independence of legitimate signals. First, we define a reliability metric based on the generalized likelihood ratio for each signal, with higher values indicating greater signal reliability. In the second step, we select the most reliable signals to compute the position, velocity, and time (PVT) and perform a multisignal authentication check, combining the reliability metrics to validate the authenticity of the final PVT solution. Its robustness is proved by testing it against a wide class of attacks. Among others, these include the optimal attack against the cross-energy check and the attack that will be proven to be statistically optimal against the proposed check itself. Finally, we also test the performance of the scheme in a scenario where only a subset of the signals has been spoofed.
增强GNSS扩频码认证:一种统计多信号方法
近年来,全球卫星导航系统面临的信号欺骗威胁日益严重,反欺骗技术的研究日益深入。本文解决了验证受扩展代码身份验证保护的信号的真实性的挑战。传统的方法依赖于接收信号与验证者使用真实码生成的发送信号的本地副本之间的相关性或交叉能量检查。然而,这些方法容易受到特定攻击。特别是,我们展示了如何仅通过使用公开可用的信息来伪造有效的欺骗信号。作为对策,我们提出了一种利用合法信号的统计独立性的两步认证协议。首先,我们根据每个信号的广义似然比定义了一个可靠性度量,值越高表明信号的可靠性越高。在第二步中,我们选择最可靠的信号来计算位置、速度和时间(PVT),并执行多信号认证检查,结合可靠性指标来验证最终PVT解决方案的真实性。它的健壮性是通过对各种攻击的测试来证明的。其中包括针对交叉能量检查的最优攻击,以及将被证明针对提议的检查本身的统计最优攻击。最后,我们还在只有一部分信号被欺骗的情况下测试了该方案的性能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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