Voltage control for DC microgrid under DoS attacks: A security predictive control approach

Abstract

DC microgrids are vulnerable to increasing cyber-security threats as communication technologies evolve. DoS attacks can destroy system access, thereby altering control signals and system dynamics. Although strategies such as zero-input or hold-input have been proposed to mitigate the effects of DoS attacks, these methods are not effective in ensuring immediate update of system control inputs, which has an impact on the overall system performance. To address this challenge, this study proposes a secure predictive control approach for DC microgrid voltage control under two-channel asynchronous DoS attacks. For the two-channel asynchronous DoS attacks, a security transmission scheme that fully utilizes the non-attack time period is designed to achieve timely update of control inputs. Furthermore, by constructing an improved secure controller based on prediction theory and active compensation mechanism, this study effectively compensates the packet loss caused by asynchronous attacks. By combining the secure transmission scheme and the improved secure predictive controller, this study ensures the asymptotic stability of DC microgrids under asynchronous DoS attacks. To verify the effectiveness and performance of the proposed method, this study conducts a series of simulations.