Capacity tariff mechanism design for grid-side energy storage in China: A Stackelberg game approach

IF 3.8 3区 经济学 Q3 ENERGY & FUELS
Shanshan Huang , Ze Ye , Yunxiang Huang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In recent years, China has been developing large-scale grid-side energy storage facilities. However, the deployment of grid-side energy storage has primarily depended on government subsidies. This paper proposes a capacity tariff mechanism for grid-side energy storage using a Stackelberg game framework, where the grid operator acts as the leader and storage operators act as followers. The results demonstrate that the proposed capacity tariff method effectively balances the storage revenue with grid operational costs, ensuring fair capacity tariffs. Compared to traditional capacity tariff methods, this approach enhances renewable energy use and reduces grid costs, supporting energy transition and sustainable development.
中国电网侧储能容量电价机制设计:一个Stackelberg博弈方法
近年来,中国一直在发展大型电网侧储能设施。然而,电网侧储能的部署主要依赖于政府补贴。本文采用Stackelberg博弈框架,提出了电网运营商作为领导者,储能运营商作为追随者的电网侧储能容量电价机制。结果表明,所提出的容量电价方法有效地平衡了储能收益与电网运行成本,保证了容量电价的公平性。与传统的容量电价方法相比,该方法提高了可再生能源的利用,降低了电网成本,支持了能源转型和可持续发展。
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来源期刊
Utilities Policy
Utilities Policy ENERGY & FUELS-ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
CiteScore
6.80
自引率
10.00%
发文量
94
审稿时长
66 days
期刊介绍: Utilities Policy is deliberately international, interdisciplinary, and intersectoral. Articles address utility trends and issues in both developed and developing economies. Authors and reviewers come from various disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, law, finance, accounting, management, and engineering. Areas of focus include the utility and network industries providing essential electricity, natural gas, water and wastewater, solid waste, communications, broadband, postal, and public transportation services. Utilities Policy invites submissions that apply various quantitative and qualitative methods. Contributions are welcome from both established and emerging scholars as well as accomplished practitioners. Interdisciplinary, comparative, and applied works are encouraged. Submissions to the journal should have a clear focus on governance, performance, and/or analysis of public utilities with an aim toward informing the policymaking process and providing recommendations as appropriate. Relevant topics and issues include but are not limited to industry structures and ownership, market design and dynamics, economic development, resource planning, system modeling, accounting and finance, infrastructure investment, supply and demand efficiency, strategic management and productivity, network operations and integration, supply chains, adaptation and flexibility, service-quality standards, benchmarking and metrics, benefit-cost analysis, behavior and incentives, pricing and demand response, economic and environmental regulation, regulatory performance and impact, restructuring and deregulation, and policy institutions.
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