The commonsense case for common morality.

Abstract

Medical ethics has historically been grounded in principles and values that can be logically deduced from the broader moral principles of ordinary life or common morality. This approach has recently been challenged by philosopher Rosamond Rhodes, who argues the opposite: namely, that medical ethics embodies a system of beliefs that cannot be logically deduced from the moral principles of daily living. She offers seven "counterexamples" that seek to show that common morality is not the universal source for medical ethics. This paper examines each of these counterexamples closely, explaining how they are flawed, in that they adopt oversimplified descriptions of common morality, inaccurate descriptions of optimal practice, or both, ultimately leading Rose to debunk straw scenarios. This paper then argues that the distinction between medical ethics based upon common morality and medical ethics based upon a specialized form of medical morality is not merely academic, but highly deleterious in clinical practice, as the latter approach shifts power from patients to philosophers.