Is "remember"-recognition faster than "know"-recognition an experimental artefact? Revealing properties of recollection and familiarity.

Abstract

In published studies using the remember/know judgement paradigm, the remember-based old/new responses (supposed to be slow and effortful) are on average faster than the know-based responses (supposed to be fast and automatic), contrary to the dual-process theories' view. One widely believed cause of this finding is that it is an experimental artefact, meaning participants are unknowingly influenced by the instruction to first consider the remember before the know alternative. In Experiment 1, we hinted to participants to first consider the know experience. This did not reverse the order of the two response times (RT). In Experiment 2, we explicitly told them to first consider the familiarity experience. Additionally, we used a decision criterion favouring making quick familiarity responses. These measures significantly lowered the RT and increased the proportion of familiarity-based responses. However, they did not change the RT of the recollection-based responses and did not reverse the relative order of the two RTs. Based on this finding and participants' inability to inhibit the retrieval of contextual details, we concluded that the paradoxical RT results are probably not an experimental artefact and that retrieval of detailed information in recollective recognition might be automatic. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).