Title: A bidding concession Enabled two-stage Peer-to-Peer market design for distributed energy storage service provision

Abstract

The increasing deployment of distributed energy resources has driven significant interest in peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading frameworks, particularly for optimizing distributed energy storage service provision (DESSP). Traditional bidding concession mechanisms primarily employ linearized models that oversimplify real-world market interactions and fail to capture the nonlinear relationship between participants’ concession strategies and market-clearing dynamics. To address this gap, this study proposes a novel P2P market design integrating a two-stage framework and a bidding concession model. Initially, we construct an iterative bidding model to quantify the nonlinear relationship between concession behavior and clearing prices, minimizing market mismatches and reducing dependence on the distribution network. We then introduce a two-stage P2P trading framework, incorporating day-ahead and intraday markets to mitigate deviations in renewable generation and load through DESSP. Finally, we construct a cross-framework credit mechanism, integrating credit into the trading rank to enhance transaction completion and market integrity and regulate pricing practices. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework decreases reliance on the distribution network by 26.29%, improves local energy matching, and reduces total operational costs by 12.12%. The credit mechanism further stabilizes market dynamics, reducing operational costs by an additional 3.36%. These findings demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach in enhancing the efficiency, stability, and fairness of P2P energy markets, providing valuable insights for future distributed energy trading systems.