How does environmental regulation fail to meet expectation? A research framework based on government strategy interaction and pollution attributes

Abstract

Environmental awareness has been present in China for an extended period; however, the results of long-term environmental governance have fallen short of expectations. This study employs a spatial Durbin model utilizing data from 275 cities in China between 2012 and 2020 to illustrate the strategic interaction of environmental regulations among local governments, as well as the differentiated implementation strategies based on various pollutant spillover characteristics. Additionally, we introduce three mechanisms—economic growth pressures, officials’ tenure, and the robustness of anti-corruption measures—to conduct a threshold effect analysis. The findings indicate a strategic execution of environmental regulations among local governments, characterized by reciprocal imitation behaviors. Variations in pollutant spillover characteristics influence local governments, resulting in distinct regulatory approaches. For pollutants with a higher spillover potential, local governments are inclined to adopt an “imitation” strategy, while for those with a lower spillover potential, a “differentiated” strategy is preferred. Economic pressures and official tenure hinder the efficacy of environmental regulations in mitigating pollution, whereas stronger governmental anti-corruption measures enhance the regulatory impact on pollution reduction. Spatial heterogeneity analysis reveals discrepancies in the execution strategies of environmental regulations both between and within regions. This research offers valuable insights into addressing the current environmental pollution challenges confronted by China and the global community.