Joint operation strategy of parking and charging infrastructure

Abstract

Charging pile sharing transforms the structure of the supply chain and influences the production decisions of parking space operators. We develop three strategies to study parking space operators’ pile-building strategies using game theory: (1) commissioning a third-party company to build piles (Strategy P), (2) self-constructing charging piles (Strategy D), and (3) co-building and sharing charging piles with other operators (Strategy C). The results show that brand advantage has a negative effect on the low-brand operator in Strategies P and D but promotes revenue in Strategy C. Interestingly, the higher the brand advantage (or brand spillover) of the parking space operator, the smaller the fixed payment for the low-brand operator. Furthermore, operator L always has the lowest revenue in Strategy P. Finally, considering the maximization of social welfare, the government should provide parking space operator with a subsidy for building piles. These findings offer policy recommendations for parking space operators and the government to promote the implications related to facilitating sustainable transportation.