{"title":"Enforcement spillovers under different networks: The case of quotas for persons with disabilities in Brazil","authors":"Samuel Berlinski , Jessica Gagete-Miranda","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103516","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines labor law enforcement spillovers in Brazil, focusing on disability quota enforcement for formal firms. New inspection procedures increased compliance through heightened inspections and fines, boosting disability hiring. The largest increase is observed among individuals with mobility impairments, followed by those with visual and cognitive impairments. Most new hires came from outside the formal labor market, while some were poached from other firms. Additionally, job tenure for persons with disabilities in large firms improved. We investigate spillover effects across various firm networks: neighborhood, ownership, and human resources specialists. Results show that spillovers can have up to 3.4 times the impact on disability employment compared to direct fines. These findings highlight the potential for targeted enforcement strategies to amplify policy effectiveness beyond directly affected firms, even in developing economies characterized by low compliance with employment laws.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 103516"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Development Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387825000677","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study examines labor law enforcement spillovers in Brazil, focusing on disability quota enforcement for formal firms. New inspection procedures increased compliance through heightened inspections and fines, boosting disability hiring. The largest increase is observed among individuals with mobility impairments, followed by those with visual and cognitive impairments. Most new hires came from outside the formal labor market, while some were poached from other firms. Additionally, job tenure for persons with disabilities in large firms improved. We investigate spillover effects across various firm networks: neighborhood, ownership, and human resources specialists. Results show that spillovers can have up to 3.4 times the impact on disability employment compared to direct fines. These findings highlight the potential for targeted enforcement strategies to amplify policy effectiveness beyond directly affected firms, even in developing economies characterized by low compliance with employment laws.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Development Economics publishes papers relating to all aspects of economic development - from immediate policy concerns to structural problems of underdevelopment. The emphasis is on quantitative or analytical work, which is relevant as well as intellectually stimulating.