Cooperative Resilient Secondary Control for AC/DC Microgrid Under Cyber Attacks

Abstract

In this brief, the distributed resilient secondary control problems under hybrid attacks involving false data injection (FDI) and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in hybrid AC/DC microgrids (MGs) are investigated. To address these issues, a distributed iterative observer is first designed to accurately estimate the FDI attack signal as well as the AC bus frequency, the AC main bus voltage, active power, and reactive power of each BIC under hybrid attacks. Then, based on the iterative mean estimation, a distributed resilient secondary controller is designed to compensate for the hybrid attacks, achieving the accurate recovery of AC bus frequency and AC main bus voltage as well as active/reactive power sharing among BICs under hybrid attacks. Compared with existing results, the proposed distributed resilient control strategy enhances the transient performance of AC/DC hybrid MGs during both the injection and disappearance of FDI attacks against hybrid attacks. Finally, through theoretical analysis and a real-time experiment in OPAL-RT, the effectiveness and plug-and-play performance of the proposed method is verified.