{"title":"An Evolutionary Game Model for Green Production Decisions of Supply Chain Enterprises Considering Supply Chain Break Risk","authors":"Fulei Shi, Chuansheng Wang, Zhenfang Qin","doi":"10.1155/int/4329215","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n <p>The problem of environmental pollution has been extensively discussed, especially in the production phase of the supply chain. Many enterprises seek innovation and strive to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental benefits. However, the cooperation and competition between enterprises are likely to cause the interruption of the supply chain. Therefore, by combining the green production strategy with supply chain risk management, this paper builds an evolutionary game model between suppliers and manufacturers, to deeply understand the impact of supply chain disruption on the choice of the green production strategy by suppliers and manufacturers and reveal the conditions under which the system evolves into different stability strategies. The results show that (1) under different conditions, the system will have an evolutionarily stable strategy. When the total revenue of green production alone by the supplier or manufacturer is greater than the expenditure and the cost of supply chain disruption is greater than the difference between the investment cost of green production and the total revenue of green production alone, the system will produce two different evolution results. (2) The cooperation willingness of the supplier and manufacturer, the investment cost of green production, and the risk coefficient of supply chain break will all affect the evolution trajectory of the system, and the greater the absolute difference between these factors and the threshold, the faster the system convergence speed. By formulating relevant policies, the system can meet the conditions of evolutionary stability strategy (1, 1), which can promote the upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain to realize cooperative green production faster. This paper contributes to the understanding of green supply chain management and evolutionary game theory, while providing insights into how companies along the supply chain can achieve cooperative green production for the benefit of society and the environment.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":14089,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligent Systems","volume":"2025 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1155/int/4329215","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Intelligent Systems","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1155/int/4329215","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The problem of environmental pollution has been extensively discussed, especially in the production phase of the supply chain. Many enterprises seek innovation and strive to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental benefits. However, the cooperation and competition between enterprises are likely to cause the interruption of the supply chain. Therefore, by combining the green production strategy with supply chain risk management, this paper builds an evolutionary game model between suppliers and manufacturers, to deeply understand the impact of supply chain disruption on the choice of the green production strategy by suppliers and manufacturers and reveal the conditions under which the system evolves into different stability strategies. The results show that (1) under different conditions, the system will have an evolutionarily stable strategy. When the total revenue of green production alone by the supplier or manufacturer is greater than the expenditure and the cost of supply chain disruption is greater than the difference between the investment cost of green production and the total revenue of green production alone, the system will produce two different evolution results. (2) The cooperation willingness of the supplier and manufacturer, the investment cost of green production, and the risk coefficient of supply chain break will all affect the evolution trajectory of the system, and the greater the absolute difference between these factors and the threshold, the faster the system convergence speed. By formulating relevant policies, the system can meet the conditions of evolutionary stability strategy (1, 1), which can promote the upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain to realize cooperative green production faster. This paper contributes to the understanding of green supply chain management and evolutionary game theory, while providing insights into how companies along the supply chain can achieve cooperative green production for the benefit of society and the environment.
期刊介绍:
The International Journal of Intelligent Systems serves as a forum for individuals interested in tapping into the vast theories based on intelligent systems construction. With its peer-reviewed format, the journal explores several fascinating editorials written by today''s experts in the field. Because new developments are being introduced each day, there''s much to be learned — examination, analysis creation, information retrieval, man–computer interactions, and more. The International Journal of Intelligent Systems uses charts and illustrations to demonstrate these ground-breaking issues, and encourages readers to share their thoughts and experiences.