Board structure and corporate strategic aggressiveness - an examination based on the double machine learning method

IF 5.2 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

中国经济评论 Pub Date : 2025-04-28 DOI:10.1016/j.chieco.2025.102422

Yang Yaowu , Cheng Qidong , Liu Yang

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

China's newly revised “Company Law” makes clear provisions regarding the composition and powers of the board of directors, which impact the formulation and implementation of corporate strategies. Taking the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2022 as the research sample, we employ double machine learning (DML) to verify the impact of board structure on corporate strategy aggressiveness, its mechanism of action and heterogeneous effects from the perspective of corporate boards. The study reveals that board structure has a significant effect on corporate strategic aggressiveness. Specifically, CEO duality enhances corporate strategic aggressiveness, a large size of the board of directors reduces corporate strategic aggressiveness, and the percentage of independent directors has a significant positive effect on corporate strategic aggressiveness. These effects can be realized through both internal control and compensation incentives. Further research shows that the effect of board structure on corporate strategic aggressiveness is more pronounced in firms whose executives have overseas backgrounds and in firms in highly competitive environments. Moreover, there is significant heterogeneity in the effect of board structure on corporate strategic aggressiveness in the presence of major exogenous shocks.

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董事会结构与企业战略进取性——基于双机器学习方法的检验

中国新修订的《公司法》对董事会的组成和权力作出了明确规定，这影响着公司战略的制定和实施。以2008 - 2022年沪深a股上市公司数据为研究样本，采用双机器学习（DML）从公司董事会的角度验证董事会结构对公司战略侵略性的影响、作用机制和异质效应。研究发现，董事会结构对企业战略侵略性有显著影响。具体而言，CEO二元性增强了公司战略侵略性，董事会规模过大降低了公司战略侵略性，独立董事比例对公司战略侵略性有显著的正向影响。这些效果可以通过内部控制和薪酬激励来实现。进一步的研究表明，董事会结构对公司战略侵略性的影响在高管具有海外背景的公司和处于高度竞争环境的公司中更为明显。此外，在存在重大外生冲击的情况下，董事会结构对公司战略侵略性的影响存在显著的异质性。

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来源期刊

中国经济评论 ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

10.60

自引率

4.40%

发文量

380

期刊介绍： The China Economic Review publishes original works of scholarship which add to the knowledge of the economy of China and to economies as a discipline. We seek, in particular, papers dealing with policy, performance and institutional change. Empirical papers normally use a formal model, a data set, and standard statistical techniques. Submissions are subjected to double-blind peer review.