Collaborative solutions for agricultural water pollution in smallholder economies: Farmers and local governments unite

Abstract

Agricultural water pollution has become a major source of surface water pollution, particularly in smallholder economies where limited resources, decentralized operations, and varying technological levels exacerbate the challenge. Existing research often overlooks the unique challenges confronted by these smallholder economies, particularly the intricate interactions between local governments and farmers, which are pivotal to the success of pollution control measures. This study addresses the complex issue of managing agricultural water pollution by exploring the synergistic role of farmers and local governments. Using dynamic evolutionary game theory, we developed a model to analyze their interactions, identifying four equilibrium points that demonstrate local asymptotic stability under specific conditions. Our findings reveal that enhanced environmental benefits, increased green preferences, and heightened social pressure directly incentivize farmers to adopt environmentally friendly behaviors. Conversely, high participation costs and the expectation of high economic gains from non-participation can deter farmers from reducing pollution. Government efforts in publicity, regulatory intensity, penalties, and subsidies significantly influence farmers' behaviors and the evolution of the game system. This study provides important insights for optimizing control strategies and promoting the harmonious coexistence of smallholder economies and environmental protection, offering a novel framework for addressing the challenges of agricultural water pollution management.