A No-Go Theorem for \(\psi \)-Ontic Models? No, Surely Not!

IF 1.2 3区物理与天体物理 Q3 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Foundations of Physics Pub Date : 2025-04-23 DOI:10.1007/s10701-025-00845-2

Shan Gao

引用次数: 0

Abstract

In a recent reply to my criticisms (Carcassi et al. in Found Phys 55:5, 2025), Carcassi, Oldofredi, and Aidala (COA) admitted that their no-go result for \(\psi \)-ontic models is based on the implicit assumption that all states are equally distinguishable, but insisted that this assumption is a part of the \(\psi \)-ontic models defined by Harrigan and Spekkens, thus maintaining their result’s validity. In this note, I refute their argument again, emphasizing that the ontological models framework (OMF) does not entail this assumption. I clarify the distinction between ontological distinctness and experimental distinguishability, showing that the latter depends on dynamics absent from OMF, and address COA’s broader claims about quantum statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics.

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\(\psi \) -Ontic模型的不可行定理？不，当然不是！

在最近对我的批评的回复中（Carcassi et al. In Found Phys 55:5, 2025）， Carcassi， Oldofredi和Aidala （COA）承认，他们对\(\psi \) -ontic模型的否定结果是基于所有状态都是可区分的隐含假设，但坚持认为这一假设是Harrigan和Spekkens定义的\(\psi \) -ontic模型的一部分，从而维持了他们的结果的有效性。在这篇文章中，我再次反驳了他们的论点，强调本体论模型框架（OMF）并不包含这种假设。我澄清了本体论独特性和实验独特性之间的区别，表明后者依赖于OMF中缺失的动力学，并解决了COA关于量子统计力学和波希曼力学的更广泛的主张。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Foundations of Physics 物理-物理：综合

CiteScore

2.70

自引率

6.70%

发文量

104

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： The conceptual foundations of physics have been under constant revision from the outset, and remain so today. Discussion of foundational issues has always been a major source of progress in science, on a par with empirical knowledge and mathematics. Examples include the debates on the nature of space and time involving Newton and later Einstein; on the nature of heat and of energy; on irreversibility and probability due to Boltzmann; on the nature of matter and observation measurement during the early days of quantum theory; on the meaning of renormalisation, and many others. Today, insightful reflection on the conceptual structure utilised in our efforts to understand the physical world is of particular value, given the serious unsolved problems that are likely to demand, once again, modifications of the grammar of our scientific description of the physical world. The quantum properties of gravity, the nature of measurement in quantum mechanics, the primary source of irreversibility, the role of information in physics – all these are examples of questions about which science is still confused and whose solution may well demand more than skilled mathematics and new experiments. Foundations of Physics is a privileged forum for discussing such foundational issues, open to physicists, cosmologists, philosophers and mathematicians. It is devoted to the conceptual bases of the fundamental theories of physics and cosmology, to their logical, methodological, and philosophical premises. The journal welcomes papers on issues such as the foundations of special and general relativity, quantum theory, classical and quantum field theory, quantum gravity, unified theories, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, cosmology, and similar.