Applauded not acclaimed? Implementation effectiveness of the tradable green certificate in renewable energy policy of China

IF 13.6 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Energy Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-13 DOI:10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108504

Yue Wang, Bangjun Wang, Linyu Cui

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

As the key tool for policy to support the growth of renewable energy, the tradable green certificate (TGC) is intended to ensure the consumption of renewable energy and support the implementation of the “dual‑carbon” strategy in China. Polarization between the amount of TGC issued and traded, however, is an issue. Accordingly, this work first establishes a two-stage supply chain Nash equilibrium game model, which includes coal and green power enterprises and power grids. Secondly, from the power generation side, considering the establishment of the linkage between TGC market and carbon market, or from the sales side, adjusting the ways for the grid to fulfill the assessment tasks of renewable energy consumption, construct the game model. Finally, the effects of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) ratio and consumption ratio on the equilibrium solution under different policy scenarios are analyzed through numerical simulation comparison. This demonstrates that: TGC has a significant phenomenon of “applauded not acclaimed” because of the dominant position of the supply side and high price; considering the establishment of carbon market and TGC market convergence or on this basis to adjust the grid to complete the task of ways of consumption, can improve the demand for TGC, weakening the ratio of RPS and consumption of the changes in the price of TGC, so as to achieve that market to “applauded and acclaimed”. The above investigates the implementation effect of TGC under RPS and carbon caps, which provides an important reference for the implementation effectiveness and sustainable development of TGC.

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鼓掌而不是欢呼？可交易绿色证书在中国可再生能源政策中的实施效果

可交易绿色证书（TGC）作为支持可再生能源发展的关键政策工具，旨在确保可再生能源的消费，支持中国实施“双碳”战略。然而，发行和交易的TGC数量之间的两极分化是一个问题。据此，本文首先建立了包括煤炭、绿色电力企业和电网在内的两阶段供应链纳什均衡博弈模型。其次，从发电端考虑建立TGC市场与碳市场的联动，或从销售端调整电网完成可再生能源消纳考核任务的方式，构建博弈模型。最后，通过数值模拟对比分析了不同政策情景下可再生能源投资组合标准（RPS）比率和消费比率对均衡解的影响。这表明：TGC由于供给侧的优势地位和高价格，存在明显的“叫好不叫好”现象；考虑建立碳市场与TGC市场趋同或在此基础上调整并网消费方式来完成任务，可以提高TGC的需求，弱化RPS与消费比例对TGC价格变化的影响，从而实现对市场的“叫好叫好”。以上考察了RPS和碳上限下TGC的实施效果，为TGC的实施效果和可持续发展提供了重要参考。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Energy Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

12.50%

发文量

524

期刊介绍： Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.