Future strategies of thermal power enterprises: What new chapter will be unveiled by the joint mechanism of energy rights and renewable energy certificates?

Abstract

The escalating global energy transition imperative has intensified governmental focus on market-based mechanisms for energy governance. This study constructs a four-party evolutionary game model incorporating prospect theory and multi-objective optimization methods to systematically investigate the combined effects of policy synergy mechanisms and market incentive designs on the development of Energy-consuming Rights Trading (ERT). We find that a dynamic penalty mechanism can effectively induce compliance from firms. Driven by loss aversion, firms prefer policy defaults, highlighting unique behavioral responses under conditions of policy uncertainty. Through 525 multi-objective optimization experiments, the study identifies Pareto-optimal policy combinations at different stages. These findings suggest that combining high penalty thresholds with gradual policy integration can enhance policy effectiveness during the incubation of the ERT market. The combination of “High integration-moderate government intervention” (a = 0.05, B3 = 3.2, C3 = 3.2) can maximize ERT market activity while minimizing government intervention costs.