Co-Opetition Network-Based Group Decision-Making Under Incomplete Information

Abstract

The integration of cooperation and competition strategies in game theory emphasizes the systematic nature of strategy spaces and group interactions, forming the basis for achieving win-win scenarios. This is particularly crucial under coalition constraints and incomplete information. Addressing these challenges, this article introduces a comprehensive mathematical method for policy formation using co-opetition topological networks. This method enables autonomous decision-making and game equilibrium in group decision scenarios, considering individual preferences amidst constraints like incomplete information and alliance limitations. Leveraging the complementary entropy theorem on superiority, inferiority, and fuzzy measures, we propose a cognitive model for information interaction and attribute fusion. Utilizing the ordered weighted averaging operator and average tree solutions aids in identifying optimal alliance structures. We subsequently discuss evaluating missing information to complete the topological network. Updating the cognitive model and value function, we develop a Gaussian oscillation heuristic algorithm to explore alliance and component strategy spaces. Simulation results are provided and analyzed to illustrate the performance and effectiveness of our approach.