Government-Opposition Voting and the Truth Behind It: An Empirical Analysis of Thai Legislators' Voting (1997–2013)

Abstract

What accounts for the inconsistency of Thai legislative behavior according to the traditional theories of legislative behavior? Previous studies have determined that partisanship and coalition membership and the electoral connection between voters and MPs in their legislative behaviors are the most significant predictors of legislative behavior, aligning with institutional theories regarding Members of Parliament voting behavior within parliamentary systems. In clientelistic and/or semi-democracies, such as Thailand, these predictors are less likely to hold. This article examines the 20th–24th Houses (1997–2013) by analyzing government-opposition dynamics based on substantive and procedural classifications of bills. The alternative theory of “tactical intra-parliamentary maneuvers” is proposed to provide a better explanation for the inconsistency of Thai legislative behavior according to the traditional theories of legislative behavior found in this Thai data and suggest a modification of traditional theories on legislative voting behavior.