Interim pre-play communication

IF 2.1 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2025-04-15 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112320

Dino Gerardi

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study communication in games with incomplete information, four or more players and rational parameters. We show that every communication equilibrium can be implemented with unmediated communication taking place at the interim stage, i.e., after the players learn their types.

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临时赛前交流

我们研究具有不完全信息、四个或更多参与者和合理参数的博弈中的交流。我们表明，在过渡阶段（即玩家了解自己的类型之后），任何沟通平衡都可以通过无中介的沟通来实现。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.