Evaluating public-private partnerships in mining: An evolutionary game theory approach to strategic dynamics and regulatory impacts

Abstract

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the mining industry face challenges such as conflicts of interest, lack of transparency, and uncertain stakeholder cooperation, which reduce the effectiveness of these collaborations. This study employs evolutionary game theory to examine the strategic dynamics between the government (as a supervisor) and contractors (as executors) in mining PPPs. The proposed model utilizes replicator dynamics and numerical simulations to analyze the impact of regulatory mechanisms, including incentives, penalties, government oversight effectiveness, and contractor cooperation incentives. Data from the Angoran lead-zinc mine are used to validate the model. The results indicate that increasing penalties and incentives within the range of 3 %–12 % of total investment accelerates contractors’ transition toward cooperation, leading to a stable equilibrium with the strategy of “government negotiation and contractor cooperation.' Furthermore, strengthening supervision and cooperation incentives by 5–15 % accelerates the stabilization of equilibrium, and cooperation is in an optimal state at 10 %, where the interests of both parties are effectively aligned. This study introduces a novel framework for modeling stakeholder behavior in mining PPPs and provides insights into achieving equilibria in the game between players, where strategic interactions stabilize through balanced regulatory influence, offering policy recommendations for effective regulatory design.