A study on the strategic behavior of players participating in air-rail intermodal transportation based on evolutionary games

Abstract

This study elaborated a tripartite evolutionary game model of civil aviation, high-speed rail (HSR), and passengers in an air-rail intermodal transport system (ARITS). It is used to find the optimal interaction between civil aviation, HSR, and passengers on non-direct journeys, as expressed in payoffs of the three players and decision-making behaviors in game. Payoff matrices of three game players were created considering travel time, fare, and mileage cost. The replicated dynamic equations were then derived to analyze the stability of the evolutionary model and the dynamic behavior of each game player under the initial status. Finally, a case of five transport corridors in China was conducted to assess the effects of such key factors as discounted fares, travel time, and mileage costs on the evolutionary trend and final strategy. The results strongly indicated that each game player would tend to choose the strategy with the highest payoff, in which civil aviation and HSR were ultimately inclined to a cooperative strategy while passengers eventually preferred to support the construction of ARITS. Besides, the variation of each game player's factors affected the trend of the tripartite evolutionary game. Still, only the discount on fares may change the final strategies of three game players, in which civil aviation would be more likely to change into a competitive strategy due to individual interests.