Geopolitics and international trade infrastructure deterrence

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106996

Sebastian Galiani , Jose Manuel Paz y Miño , Gustavo Torrens

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Abstract

We develop a simple (incumbent versus entrant) strategic deterrence model to study the economic and geopolitical interactions underlying a strategic international activity, such as trade-related infrastructure projects like the Panama Canal. We study the incentives for global geopolitical players to support allied satellite countries where the strategic activity takes place or could potentially be initiated. We show that even if no effective competitor emerges, the appearance of a geopolitical challenger capable of credibly supporting the entrant has a pro-competition economic effect which benefits consumers all over the world. Thus, we provide a mechanism through which geopolitical rivalry between global powers leads to better economic outcomes for the global economy (i.e., less market power in the provision of international trade-related infrastructure). This contrasts with previous research on politics and market power which emphasizes the negative effects of political interference as well as research on international relations which often highlights the negative global effects of rising geopolitical tensions between an established power and a emerging challenger.

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地缘政治和国际贸易基础设施威慑

我们开发了一个简单的（在位者与进入者）战略威慑模型来研究战略国际活动（如与贸易相关的基础设施项目，如巴拿马运河）背后的经济和地缘政治相互作用。我们研究了全球地缘政治参与者支持战略活动发生或可能发起的盟国卫星国的动机。我们表明，即使没有有效的竞争对手出现，能够可靠地支持进入者的地缘政治挑战者的出现也会产生有利于竞争的经济效应，使全世界的消费者受益。因此，我们提供了一种机制，通过这种机制，全球大国之间的地缘政治竞争可以为全球经济带来更好的经济结果（即，在提供与国际贸易相关的基础设施方面，市场力量减少）。这与之前关于政治和市场力量的研究形成鲜明对比，前者强调政治干预的负面影响，而后者则经常强调老牌大国与新兴挑战者之间地缘政治紧张局势加剧对全球的负面影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

392

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.