Payments and privacy in the digital economy

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-08 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104050

Toni Ahnert , Peter Hoffmann , Cyril Monnet

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We propose a model of lending, payments choice, and privacy in the digital economy. While digital payments enable merchants to sell goods online, they reveal information to their lender. Cash guarantees anonymity, but limits distribution to less efficient offline venues. In equilibrium, merchants trade off the efficiency gains from online distribution (with digital payments) and the informational rents from staying anonymous (with cash). While new technologies can reduce the privacy concerns associated with digital payments, they also redistribute surplus from the lender to merchants. Hence, privacy enhancements do not always improve welfare.

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数字经济中的支付和隐私

我们提出了一个数字经济中借贷、支付选择和隐私的模型。虽然数字支付使商家能够在网上销售商品，但他们会向贷款人泄露信息。现金保证匿名，但限制了分销到效率较低的线下场所。在平衡状态下，商家会权衡在线分销（用数字支付）带来的效率收益和匿名（用现金支付）带来的信息租金。虽然新技术可以减少与数字支付相关的隐私问题，但它们也会将余额从贷方重新分配给商家。因此，隐私增强并不总是能改善福利。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.