The collusion trap: Business - political collusion and flood risk management in Indonesia

Abstract

Flooding poses the most significant risk in Indonesia due to its frequency, widespread impact, and the extensive damage it causes. However, some cities are relatively successful in managing floods, while other cities fail. How can cities within the same national boundaries facing similar challenges, perform so differently when it comes to flood management? Applying a political economy approach, and building on a combination of extensive fieldwork and policy analysis, this study argues that pervasive politico-business collusion, a common feature of local politics in Indonesia, hinders the effectiveness of flood risk management. This type of deal-making undermines policy interventions in infrastructural works, spatial planning and diminishes the overall effectiveness of flood risk management policies. Cities that have been able to curtail the collusion achieve better results, as evidenced by a reduction in the number of flood cases and affected population. Progressive political leaders who form strategic alliances with civil society have been able to prioritize public interests, resulting in improved drainage systems and better water catchment areas or green zones protection, leading to effective flood risk management. This study develops these arguments on the basis of a detailed comparative study of Flood Risk Management (FRM) efforts in two Indonesian cities: Semarang and Surabaya. This study unravels processes and mechanisms that also determine the success and failure of the FRM agenda outside of existing discussions in literature and global policy models. This way, it contributes to urgent debate about flood management, disaster risk reduction, and climate adaptation beyond the case of Indonesia.