Indirect reciprocity in the public goods game with collective reputations.

IF 3.7 2区 综合性期刊 Q1 MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES
Journal of The Royal Society Interface Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2025-04-02 DOI:10.1098/rsif.2024.0827
Ming Wei, Xin Wang, Longzhao Liu, Hongwei Zheng, Yishen Jiang, Yajing Hao, Zhiming Zheng, Feng Fu, Shaoting Tang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity unveils how social cooperation is founded upon moral systems. Within the frame of dyadic games based on individual reputations, the 'leading-eight' strategies distinguish themselves in promoting and sustaining cooperation. However, in real-world societies, there are widespread interactions at the group level, where individuals need to make a singular action choice when facing multiple individuals with different reputations. Here, through introducing the assessment of collective reputations, we develop a framework that embeds group-level reputation structure into public goods games to study the evolution of group-level indirect reciprocity. We show that changing the criteria of group assessment destabilizes the reputation dynamics of leading-eight strategies. In a particular range of social assessment criteria, all leading-eight strategies can break the social dilemma in public goods games and sustain cooperation. Specifically, there exists an optimal, moderately set assessment criterion that is most conducive to promoting cooperation. Moreover, in the evolution of assessment criteria, the preference of the leading-eight strategies for social strictness is inversely correlated with the payoff level. Our work reveals the impact of social strictness on prosocial behaviour, highlighting the importance of group-level interactions in the analysis of evolutionary games and complex social dynamics.

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来源期刊
Journal of The Royal Society Interface
Journal of The Royal Society Interface 综合性期刊-综合性期刊
CiteScore
7.10
自引率
2.60%
发文量
234
审稿时长
2.5 months
期刊介绍: J. R. Soc. Interface welcomes articles of high quality research at the interface of the physical and life sciences. It provides a high-quality forum to publish rapidly and interact across this boundary in two main ways: J. R. Soc. Interface publishes research applying chemistry, engineering, materials science, mathematics and physics to the biological and medical sciences; it also highlights discoveries in the life sciences of relevance to the physical sciences. Both sides of the interface are considered equally and it is one of the only journals to cover this exciting new territory. J. R. Soc. Interface welcomes contributions on a diverse range of topics, including but not limited to; biocomplexity, bioengineering, bioinformatics, biomaterials, biomechanics, bionanoscience, biophysics, chemical biology, computer science (as applied to the life sciences), medical physics, synthetic biology, systems biology, theoretical biology and tissue engineering.
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