Behavioral subgame perfect implementation

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-04-02 DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106992

Makoto Hagiwara

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine implementation problems in settings where individuals’ choice behavior may not be rational and sequential game forms are considered. First, we present an example in which a social choice rule that is not implementable in “behavioral” Nash equilibria (Proposition 6 in de Clippel (2014)) can be implemented in behavioral subgame perfect equilibria using a three-stage game form. Subsequently, we explore the use of sequential game forms in general implementation problems and provide a necessary condition and two sufficient conditions for implementability in behavioral subgame perfect equilibria.

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行为子游戏的完美执行

我们研究了在个体选择行为可能不理性和考虑顺序博弈形式的情况下的实施问题。首先，我们提出了一个例子，在“行为”纳什均衡（de Clippel（2014）的提案6）中无法实现的社会选择规则可以使用三阶段博弈形式在行为子博弈完美均衡中实现。随后，我们探讨了序列博弈形式在一般执行问题中的应用，并给出了行为子博弈完全均衡可执行的一个必要条件和两个充分条件。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

392

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.