Anti-spoofing performance analysis of typical GNSS-based railway train positioning schemes

Abstract

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) are vulnerable to both unintentional interference and intentional attacks, making it difficult to meet the stringent safety requirements of railway train control systems. The growing threat to information security posed by spoofing attacks has received limited attention. This study investigates the impact of GNSS spoofing attacks on train positioning, emphasizing their detrimental effects on the accuracy and availability of train location report functions for train operation control. To explore the anti-spoofing performance of typical GNSS-based train positioning schemes, specific approaches, and system architectures are designed under two GNSS-alone and two GNSS-integrated train positioning schemes. Field data are utilized to establish spoofing attack scenarios for GNSS-based train positioning, with which the anti-spoofing capabilities of different train positioning schemes are evaluated. Experimental results indicate that under specific conditions, the GNSS-integrated positioning schemes demonstrate superior GNSS spoofing suppression capabilities. Results of the tests present valuable guidance for designers and manufacturers in developing more advanced and resilient train positioning solutions and equipment for the next generation of train control systems, thereby promoting the applications of GNSS technology in railway systems.