Meltdown of trust in weakly governed economies

Abstract

A well-functioning society requires well-functioning institutions that ensure prosperity, fair distribution of wealth, social participation, security, and informative media. Such institutions are built on a foundation of trust. However, while trust is essential for economic success and good governance, interconnected mechanisms inherent in weakly governed market economies tend to undermine the very trust on which such success depends. These mechanisms include the intrinsic tendency for inequality to grow, media to boost perceived unfairness, and self-interest to gain rewards at the expense of others. These mechanisms, if left unchecked, allow wealth concentration to result in state capture where institutions facilitate further wealth concentration instead of the promoting the common good. As a result, people may become alienated and untrusting of fellow citizens and of institutions. Several democracies now experience such dynamics, the United States being a prime example. We discuss ways in which well-functioning democracies can design institutions to help avoid this social trap, and the much harder challenge of escaping the trap once in it. Successful cases such as the ability of Scandinavian democracies to maintain high-trust, and the US progressive era in the early 20th century provide instructive examples.