The differences in effects of social image by gender using risky dictator game experiments

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS

Research in Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI:10.1016/j.rie.2025.101056

Tetsuya Kawamura , Kazuhito Ogawa , Yusuke Osaki

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Experimental evidence has revealed that females are more prosocial than males. However, we do not know much about what lies in differences in prosocial behavior in gender. The research question of this study is how effects of social image differ by gender and these effects can explain gender differences in prosocial behavior. Social image is a desire to be perceived as fair and is impure motivation behind prosocial behavior. Experimental studies developed various devices to extract social image and observed its existence in dictator game experiments. However, these methods are not suitable for our purpose because we need to measure the effects of social image, not just existence. This study conducted the risky dictator game in which dictators do not care about their social image because recipients cannot infer dictator's allocation. By adding social image, we prepare the two types of risky dictator games with and without social image. We measure social image based on differences in amount and probability of positive allocation in risky dictator game experiments with and without social image. This study observed differences in effects of social image by gender. We draw conclusion that social image is a cause for gender differences in prosocial behavior.

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来源期刊

Research in Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

89 days

期刊介绍： Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.