The role of environmental feedback in promoting cooperation among unequal groups

Abstract

Cooperation plays a crucial role in addressing social dilemmas, yet inequality complicates the achievement of cooperation. This paper explores how environmental feedback mechanisms influence the evolution of cooperation within unequal groups. We construct a public goods game model that includes productivity and endowment inequalities and introduce a dynamic environmental feedback mechanism to study individual strategy choices in different environmental states. The results indicate that appropriate environmental feedback significantly improves cooperation levels. When there is only productivity inequality, appropriate environmental feedback increases the tendency of all individuals to cooperate, especially those with low productivity. In both productivity and endowment inequality, participants maintain a high level of cooperation when the initial endowment distribution falls within a certain range. Once the initial distribution of endowments exceeds this range, cooperative behavior quickly deteriorates. Our study provides a promising approach to enhancing the propensity for cooperation in unequal populations and highlights the significant role of adequate environmental feedback in promoting cooperation.