Evolution of trust in the N-player trust game with transformation incentive mechanism.

IF 3.7 2区 综合性期刊 Q1 MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES
Journal of The Royal Society Interface Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-03-26 DOI:10.1098/rsif.2024.0726
Yuyuan Liu, Lichen Wang, Ruqiang Guo, Shijia Hua, Linjie Liu, Liang Zhang, The Anh Han
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Trust game is commonly used to study the evolution of trust among unrelated individuals. It offers valuable insights into human interactions in a range of disciplines, including economics, sociology and psychology. Previous research has revealed that reward and punishment systems can effectively promote the evolution of trust. However, these investigations overlook the gaming environment, leaving unresolved the optimal conditions for employing distinct incentives to effectively facilitate trust level. To bridge this gap, we introduce a transformation incentive mechanism in an N-player trust game, where trustees are given different forms of incentives depending on the number of trustees in the group. Using the Markov decision process approach, our research shows that as incentives increase, the level of trust rises continuously, eventually reaching a high level of coexistence between investors and trustworthy trustees. Specifically, in the case of smaller incentives, rewarding trustworthy trustees is more effective. Conversely, in the case of larger incentives, punishing untrustworthy trustees is more effective. Additionally, we find that moderate incentives have a positive impact on increasing the average payoff within the group.

基于转换激励机制的n人信任博弈中的信任演化。
信任博弈是研究无亲缘关系个体间信任演化的常用方法。它为经济学、社会学和心理学等一系列学科的人类互动提供了有价值的见解。已有研究表明,奖惩机制能够有效地促进信任的进化。然而,这些调查忽视了游戏环境,没有解决使用不同激励机制有效促进信任水平的最佳条件。为了弥补这一差距,我们在一个n人信任博弈中引入了一种转换激励机制,在这种机制中,根据群体中受托人的数量,受托人被给予不同形式的激励。利用马尔可夫决策过程方法,我们的研究表明,随着激励的增加,信任水平不断上升,最终达到投资者与可信赖受托人之间的高度共存。具体来说,在激励较小的情况下,奖励值得信赖的受托人更有效。相反,在激励更大的情况下,惩罚不值得信任的受托人更有效。此外,我们发现适度的激励对增加群体内的平均报酬有积极的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of The Royal Society Interface
Journal of The Royal Society Interface 综合性期刊-综合性期刊
CiteScore
7.10
自引率
2.60%
发文量
234
审稿时长
2.5 months
期刊介绍: J. R. Soc. Interface welcomes articles of high quality research at the interface of the physical and life sciences. It provides a high-quality forum to publish rapidly and interact across this boundary in two main ways: J. R. Soc. Interface publishes research applying chemistry, engineering, materials science, mathematics and physics to the biological and medical sciences; it also highlights discoveries in the life sciences of relevance to the physical sciences. Both sides of the interface are considered equally and it is one of the only journals to cover this exciting new territory. J. R. Soc. Interface welcomes contributions on a diverse range of topics, including but not limited to; biocomplexity, bioengineering, bioinformatics, biomaterials, biomechanics, bionanoscience, biophysics, chemical biology, computer science (as applied to the life sciences), medical physics, synthetic biology, systems biology, theoretical biology and tissue engineering.
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