{"title":"Nullified-game consistency and axiomatizations of the Core of TU-games with a fixed player set","authors":"Takuto Kaneko , Satoshi Nakada","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112274","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We provide new axiomatic foundations for the Core of TU-games with a fixed player set. Our main axiom is referred to as <em>nullified reduced game consistency</em>, which is a natural counterpart of reduced game consistency in the setting with a universal player set. We consider three types of nullified reduced game consistency axioms, each of which corresponds to the max-, complement-, and projection-reduced game consistency in the literature. We show that each property, together with other standard axioms, characterizes the Core. As a result, our characterization results uncover implicit restrictions on solutions imposed by consistency in the universal player set.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"250 ","pages":"Article 112274"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176525001119","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We provide new axiomatic foundations for the Core of TU-games with a fixed player set. Our main axiom is referred to as nullified reduced game consistency, which is a natural counterpart of reduced game consistency in the setting with a universal player set. We consider three types of nullified reduced game consistency axioms, each of which corresponds to the max-, complement-, and projection-reduced game consistency in the literature. We show that each property, together with other standard axioms, characterizes the Core. As a result, our characterization results uncover implicit restrictions on solutions imposed by consistency in the universal player set.
期刊介绍:
Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.