Nullified-game consistency and axiomatizations of the Core of TU-games with a fixed player set

IF 2.1 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Takuto Kaneko , Satoshi Nakada
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We provide new axiomatic foundations for the Core of TU-games with a fixed player set. Our main axiom is referred to as nullified reduced game consistency, which is a natural counterpart of reduced game consistency in the setting with a universal player set. We consider three types of nullified reduced game consistency axioms, each of which corresponds to the max-, complement-, and projection-reduced game consistency in the literature. We show that each property, together with other standard axioms, characterizes the Core. As a result, our characterization results uncover implicit restrictions on solutions imposed by consistency in the universal player set.
具有固定玩家集的tu游戏核心的无效游戏一致性和公理化
我们为具有固定玩家集的tu游戏的核心提供了新的公理基础。我们的主要公理被称为无效的简化博弈一致性,这是具有普遍玩家集的设置中的简化博弈一致性的自然对应。我们考虑了三种类型的无效化约博弈一致性公理,每一种都对应于文献中的最大化约博弈一致性、补化约博弈一致性和投影化约博弈一致性。我们证明了每一个性质,连同其他的标准公理,都是核心的特征。因此,我们的表征结果揭示了普遍参与人集中的一致性对解决方案施加的隐含限制。
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来源期刊
Economics Letters
Economics Letters ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.00%
发文量
348
审稿时长
30 days
期刊介绍: Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.
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