Vaccination and Collective Action Under Social Norms.

Abstract

Social dynamics are an integral part of the spread of disease affecting contact rates as well as the adoption of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions. When vaccines provide waning immunity, efficient and timely uptake of boosters is required to maintain protection and reduce infections. How then do social dynamics affect the timely uptake of vaccines and thereby the course of an epidemic? This paper explores this scenario through a behavioural-epidemiological model. It features a tipping-point dynamic for the uptake of vaccines that combines the risk of infection, perceived morbidity risk of the vaccine, and social payoffs for deviating from the vaccination decision-making of others. The social payoffs are derived from a social norm of conformity, and they create a collective action problem. A key finding driven by this dilemma is that waves of vaccine uptake and infections can occur due to inefficient and delayed uptake of boosters. This results in a nonlinear response of the infection load to the transmission rate: an intermediate transmission rate can result in greater prevalence of disease relative to more or less transmissible diseases. Further, global information about the prevalence of the disease and vaccine uptake can increase the infection load and peak relative to information restricted to individuals' contact networks. Thus, decisions driven by local information can mitigate the collective action problem across the population. Finally, the optimal public policy program to promote boosters is shown to be one that focuses on overcoming the social inertia to vaccinate at the start of an epidemic.