{"title":"Clarifying Mutual Consent's Role in Agency Law.","authors":"Rachel Leow","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqae031","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Important cases and academic commentators have suggested that the mutual consent of principal and agent is necessary for actual authority to be conferred on the agent. The chief purpose of this article is to show that this view of mutual consent's role in agency law is inaccurate and misleading. Its central claim is that the agent's consent is not a necessary pre-condition for the conferral of authority. Instead, a principal can confer authority on an agent unilaterally. However, when authority is conferred unilaterally on an agent, the external aspect of agency is fully present, but the internal principal-agent relationship possesses two unique features, one relating to the agent's duties and the other relating to the agent's ability to disclaim. The account presented here thus clarifies the proper scope of 'mutual consent' justifications in agency. Mutual consent may justify some incidents of agency, but it does not justify them all.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"45 1","pages":"1-25"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11928224/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqae031","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2025/1/1 0:00:00","PubModel":"eCollection","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
Important cases and academic commentators have suggested that the mutual consent of principal and agent is necessary for actual authority to be conferred on the agent. The chief purpose of this article is to show that this view of mutual consent's role in agency law is inaccurate and misleading. Its central claim is that the agent's consent is not a necessary pre-condition for the conferral of authority. Instead, a principal can confer authority on an agent unilaterally. However, when authority is conferred unilaterally on an agent, the external aspect of agency is fully present, but the internal principal-agent relationship possesses two unique features, one relating to the agent's duties and the other relating to the agent's ability to disclaim. The account presented here thus clarifies the proper scope of 'mutual consent' justifications in agency. Mutual consent may justify some incidents of agency, but it does not justify them all.
期刊介绍：
The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies is published on behalf of the Faculty of Law in the University of Oxford. It is designed to encourage interest in all matters relating to law, with an emphasis on matters of theory and on broad issues arising from the relationship of law to other disciplines. No topic of legal interest is excluded from consideration. In addition to traditional questions of legal interest, the following are all within the purview of the journal: comparative and international law, the law of the European Community, legal history and philosophy, and interdisciplinary material in areas of relevance.
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