Predation by stock price manipulation

IF 7.2 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102770

Rafael Matta , Sergio H. Rocha , Paulo Vaz

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We develop a model in which feedback effects from equity markets allow uninformed traders to profit by short selling a firm’s stock while going long on its product market competitor. As this strategy distorts the investment of the firm targeted by short selling to the benefit of its rival, we label it predation by stock price manipulation. A short selling ban does not prevent manipulation since the speculator can still induce a firm to underinvest by establishing a long position in its rival. Our analysis unveils how competitive interactions among firms expand the scope of manipulation, providing new insights into equity markets and short sales regulation.

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通过操纵股价进行掠夺

我们开发了一个模型，在这个模型中，来自股票市场的反馈效应允许不知情的交易者通过卖空一家公司的股票而获利，同时做多其市场竞争对手的产品。由于这种策略通过卖空来扭曲目标公司的投资，从而使其竞争对手受益，我们将其称为股价操纵的掠夺行为。卖空禁令并不能防止操纵行为，因为投机者仍然可以通过建立竞争对手的多头头寸，诱使一家公司投资不足。我们的分析揭示了公司之间的竞争互动如何扩大了操纵的范围，为股票市场和卖空监管提供了新的见解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.80

自引率

3.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.