Market reactions to the Basel reforms: Implications for shareholders, creditors, and taxpayers

Abstract

This paper evaluates the impact of postcrisis financial risk regulation introduced through Basel II.5, Basel III, and Basel IV on European Union (EU) and United States (U.S.) bank shareholders and creditors. Specifically, an event study is used to analyze 15 market events, 26 credit events, and 13 liquidity events. This approach allows for an assessment of the impact on profitability and risk, providing a basis for deriving the effectiveness of these regulations in reducing risks for the public sector and taxpayers. Significant negative stock market reactions by EU banks in response to market and credit risk regulations are observed. In contrast, U.S. banks exhibit no clear significant stock market reactions, largely due to the Dodd-Frank Act and especially more lenient regulatory implementation. EU creditors responded to credit risk regulation with significantly rising credit default swap (CDS) spreads, signaling higher risks due to diminished bailout expectations. The cross-sectional analysis highlights the importance of bank- and country-specific factors in explaining heterogeneous reactions. The results suggest that the Basel reforms have successfully shifted risks from taxpayers back to shareholders and reduced moral hazard among creditors. However, the significant differences between the EU and U.S. market reactions raise concerns about the establishment of a level playing field, underscoring the need for more consistent implementation across jurisdictions.