Does third-party monitoring reduce environmental violations in mining firms?

IF 10.2 2区 经济学 0 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
Renjie Zhou , Yongheng Luo , Zhengye Gao
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Compared to air and water pollution, mining pollution is often more difficult to identify and monitor due to its inherent concealment and persistence. The inadequacy of government regulatory oversight also implies the potential to leverage the widespread and continuous benefits of third-party monitoring. This study conducts a quasi-natural experiment based on the Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) project launched by environmental organizations to observe the net impact of third-party monitoring on firms. Using longitudinal data (2006–2018) on Chinese listed firms in the mining industry, and based on a series of endogeneity and robustness tests, we observe robust evidence that third-party monitoring can significantly reduce corporate environmental violations in mining firms. Heterogeneity analysis shows that, compared to non-open-pit mining firms, open-pit mining firms show a more pronounced improvement in the impact of third-party monitoring on corporate environmental violations. And compared to non-coal mining firms, coal mining firms are more susceptible to third-party monitoring. Mechanism analysis shows that third-party monitoring works through promoting government environmental enforcement, broader public participation, and firms' disclosure quality. Further analysis suggests that third-party monitoring can still be effective in cases where environmental enforcement is weak.
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来源期刊
Resources Policy
Resources Policy ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES-
CiteScore
13.40
自引率
23.50%
发文量
602
审稿时长
69 days
期刊介绍: Resources Policy is an international journal focused on the economics and policy aspects of mineral and fossil fuel extraction, production, and utilization. It targets individuals in academia, government, and industry. The journal seeks original research submissions analyzing public policy, economics, social science, geography, and finance in the fields of mining, non-fuel minerals, energy minerals, fossil fuels, and metals. Mineral economics topics covered include mineral market analysis, price analysis, project evaluation, mining and sustainable development, mineral resource rents, resource curse, mineral wealth and corruption, mineral taxation and regulation, strategic minerals and their supply, and the impact of mineral development on local communities and indigenous populations. The journal specifically excludes papers with agriculture, forestry, or fisheries as their primary focus.
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