Warehouse receipt pledge financing using blockchain data asset

IF 7.5 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Junhuan Zhang , Kewei Cai , Qiuhong Zhao
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The core essence of corporate governance lies in the governance framework and system that integrates accountability, transparency, fairness, responsibility, and risk management. This paper constructs a warehouse receipt data asset pledge financing model to analyze the financing decisions and behaviors between banks and enterprises. It aims to address the issues of information asymmetry and risk management in corporate governance within the context of blockchain technology. Firstly, in order to evaluate the value of data assets, this paper constructs a data asset evaluation model based on the data assets of the participants in the warehouse receipt pledge financing business which is divided into three parts: the financing party, the transaction partner, and the transaction environment. Secondly, based on the lending game between banks and enterprises, this paper constructs a warehouse receipt data asset pledge financing model to explore the financing interest rate and pledge rate levels provided by banks to different enterprises. Finally, an evolutionary game model is established based on the warehouse receipt pledge financing business of the bank and supply chain system, and the factors affecting the behavior and choice of the bank and supply chain system in the process of blockchain technology practice are visualized through simulation analysis. The results show that, firstly, the relationship between corporate operating income and loan scale is the initial consideration for banks when formulating loan conditions. The pledge rate and financing interest rate have a negative correlation. Higher data asset value leads to a higher pledge rate, which lowers the cost of funding for enterprises. Secondly, under certain circumstances, the equilibrium is that banks tend to use blockchain technology while supply chain systems tend to uphold promises. Thirdly, the blockchain construction cost and information cost restrict banks’ adoption of blockchain technology. Fourthly, the penalty mechanism significantly influences firms in choosing a stable compliance strategy.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
9.80%
发文量
366
期刊介绍: The International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) is an impartial refereed journal designed to serve as a platform for high-quality financial research. It welcomes a diverse range of financial research topics and maintains an unbiased selection process. While not limited to U.S.-centric subjects, IRFA, as its title suggests, is open to valuable research contributions from around the world.
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