{"title":"Michael Heim’s Concept of “Metaphysics” of Virtual Worlds. A Proposal of Improving it","authors":"Małgorzata Czarnocka, Mariusz Mazurek","doi":"10.1007/s10699-025-09976-1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze Michael Heim’s significant concept of the metaphysics of virtual worlds and show that his concept does not meet the two basic metatheses of metaphysics understood as ontology. First, Heim defines virtual worlds as knowledge, more specifically as informational equivalents of physical things; and worlds understood in this way are not objects in the ontological sense of the term. Secondly, Heim claims that virtual worlds do not exist, and attributes to them various degrees of non-existence, and the metaphysics of non-existent in various degrees virtual objects is extremely hard to accept. We propose replacing these two essential elements in Heim’s concept with others. In result, we form a metaphysics of existent and objectivized virtual worlds, on the basis of the ideas postulated by Heim.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Foundations of Science","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-025-09976-1","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We analyze Michael Heim’s significant concept of the metaphysics of virtual worlds and show that his concept does not meet the two basic metatheses of metaphysics understood as ontology. First, Heim defines virtual worlds as knowledge, more specifically as informational equivalents of physical things; and worlds understood in this way are not objects in the ontological sense of the term. Secondly, Heim claims that virtual worlds do not exist, and attributes to them various degrees of non-existence, and the metaphysics of non-existent in various degrees virtual objects is extremely hard to accept. We propose replacing these two essential elements in Heim’s concept with others. In result, we form a metaphysics of existent and objectivized virtual worlds, on the basis of the ideas postulated by Heim.
期刊介绍：
Foundations of Science focuses on methodological and philosophical topics of foundational significance concerning the structure and the growth of science. It serves as a forum for exchange of views and ideas among working scientists and theorists of science and it seeks to promote interdisciplinary cooperation.
Since the various scientific disciplines have become so specialized and inaccessible to workers in different areas of science, one of the goals of the journal is to present the foundational issues of science in a way that is free from unnecessary technicalities yet faithful to the scientific content. The aim of the journal is not simply to identify and highlight foundational issues and problems, but to suggest constructive solutions to the problems.
The editors of the journal admit that various sciences have approaches and methods that are peculiar to those individual sciences. However, they hold the view that important truths can be discovered about and by the sciences and that truths transcend cultural and political contexts. Although properly conducted historical and sociological inquiries can explain some aspects of the scientific enterprise, the editors believe that the central foundational questions of contemporary science can be posed and answered without recourse to sociological or historical methods.
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