Why a responsibility sensitive healthcare system is not disrespectful.

IF 2.3 2区 哲学 Q1 ETHICS
Lydia Tsiakiri
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Abstract

The prevalence of non-communicable diseases, the related increased medical costs, and the recent public health emergency bring out more forcefully pre-existing dilemmas of distributive justice in the healthcare context. Under this reality, would it be justified to hold people responsible for their taken lifestyle decisions, or would it constitute an instance of unjustified disrespectful treatment? From a respect-based standpoint, one could argue that a responsibility-sensitive healthcare system morally disrespects the imprudent ones engaging in disadvantageous differential treatment to their detriment. In contrast, however, we might also have luck egalitarian reasons that explain why this differential treatment is not unjust. Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice, which argues that it is bad if some people are worse off than others through no voluntary fault of their own. In this paper, I clarify the concerns about disrespect raised against the luck egalitarian viewpoint and offer possible respect-based reasons for why this might not be the case grounded in deontological concepts. First, I employ a revised Double-effect case to support responsibility-sensitive rationing. In the last part of the paper, these are further supported through the Kantian Formula of Humanity supplemented by the concept of duties.

为什么一个责任敏感的医疗系统不是不尊重。
非传染性疾病的流行、相关的医疗费用增加以及最近的突发公共卫生事件,更有力地凸显了医疗保健领域中原本就存在的分配正义困境。在这种现实情况下,让人们为自己的生活方式决定负责是合理的,还是会构成一种不合理的无礼对待?从基于尊重的角度来看,人们可能会认为,责任敏感的医疗体系在道德上不尊重那些不谨慎的人,他们从事不利的差别待遇,从而损害他们的利益。然而,相比之下,我们也可能有运气平等主义的理由来解释为什么这种差别待遇不是不公平的。运气平均主义是一种责任敏感的分配正义理论,该理论认为,如果一些人不是由于自己的自愿过错而比其他人更糟糕,那就不好了。在本文中,我澄清了对运气平等主义观点提出的不尊重的担忧,并提供了可能的基于尊重的理由,说明为什么这可能不是基于义务论概念的情况。首先,我采用了一个修正的双效应案例来支持责任敏感配给。在论文的最后一部分,通过康德的人性公式和义务概念的补充来进一步支持这些观点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
4.80%
发文量
64
期刊介绍: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy: A European Journal is the official journal of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care. It provides a forum for international exchange of research data, theories, reports and opinions in bioethics and philosophy of medicine. The journal promotes interdisciplinary studies, and stimulates philosophical analysis centered on a common object of reflection: health care, the human effort to deal with disease, illness, death as well as health, well-being and life. Particular attention is paid to developing contributions from all European countries, and to making accessible scientific work and reports on the practice of health care ethics, from all nations, cultures and language areas in Europe.
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