Significant expected lifetime credit loss impairments: Determinants of bank loss recognition and stability implications

Abstract

This paper explores how a recognition threshold approach for significant expected lifetime credit losses (ELCL) affects the joint surplus of a bank's debtholders and shareholders (bank social value). Banks play a dual role in the economy by supplying credit to the real sector and providing liquidity to depositors. Information released on ELCL induces sound risk-taking in credit supply while potentially distorting the bank's liquidity provision. A recognition threshold for ELCL can balance these social gains and costs by restricting ELCL recognition for a transaction to extreme outcomes. In this balancing act, the recognition threshold enhances a bank's social value by providing sufficient incentives for sound risk-taking while decreasing the social costs of liquidity disruption. Less favorable economic conditions necessitate tighter recognition thresholds to sustain sound risk-taking, which inflates the social costs of liquidity disruption. When these costs become excessive, the balance is disrupted, and forgoing ELCL recognition can enhance the bank's social value. While this practice safeguards stability in the short run, it ultimately undermines it in the long run. From a policy perspective, the results highlight the value of the principle-based notion of IFRS 9's significant increase in credit risk (SICR) criterion to address bank-specific trade-offs and increase a bank's social value. Uniformity of recognition thresholds can be demonstrated for at least a subset of banks. Lastly, the paper emphasizes that a recognition threshold approach does not maximize the social value of a bank, and more complex disclosure rules can further increase it.