{"title":"(Not) Canceling out the cross-section: Mitigating the effect of peremptory challenges on jury selection","authors":"Francis X. Flanagan","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106259","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury. According to current precedent, this requires individual jurors to be unbiased and the jury to have a fair possibility of being a representative cross-section of the community. I show that current selection procedures systematically exclude certain types of jurors, making it impossible to achieve a representative cross-section. I argue that this violates the requirements for an impartial jury, and I propose an alternative jury selection procedure that is incentive compatible and eliminates the distortion created by the current system. The new procedure also reduces the variance of the seated jury relative to a random selection, when measuring variance by distance to the median jury, which makes the application of justice less arbitrary. Data from Mississippi and Louisiana are analyzed to illustrate the results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 106259"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818825000158","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury. According to current precedent, this requires individual jurors to be unbiased and the jury to have a fair possibility of being a representative cross-section of the community. I show that current selection procedures systematically exclude certain types of jurors, making it impossible to achieve a representative cross-section. I argue that this violates the requirements for an impartial jury, and I propose an alternative jury selection procedure that is incentive compatible and eliminates the distortion created by the current system. The new procedure also reduces the variance of the seated jury relative to a random selection, when measuring variance by distance to the median jury, which makes the application of justice less arbitrary. Data from Mississippi and Louisiana are analyzed to illustrate the results.
期刊介绍:
The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.