Exploring the Evolution of Altruistic Punishment with a PDE Model of Cultural Multilevel Selection.

Abstract

Two mechanisms that have been used to study the evolution of cooperative behavior are altruistic punishment, in which cooperative individuals pay additional costs to punish defection, and multilevel selection, in which competition between groups can help to counteract individual-level incentives to cheat. Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and Richerson have used simulation models of cultural evolution to suggest that altruistic punishment and pairwise group-level competition can work in concert to promote cooperation, even when neither mechanism can do so on its own. In this paper, we formulate a PDE model for multilevel selection motivated by the approach of Boyd and coauthors, modeling individual-level birth-death competition with a replicator equation based on individual payoffs and describing group-level competition with pairwise conflicts based on differences in the average payoffs of the competing groups. Building off of existing PDE models for multilevel selection with frequency-independent group-level competition, we use analytical and numerical techniques to understand how the forms of individual and average payoffs can impact the long-time ability to sustain altruistic punishment in group-structured populations. We find several interesting differences between the behavior of our new PDE model with pairwise group-level competition and existing multilevel PDE models, including the observation that our new model can feature a non-monotonic dependence of the long-time collective payoff on the strength of altruistic punishment. Going forward, our PDE framework can serve as a way to connect and compare disparate approaches for understanding multilevel selection across the literature in evolutionary biology and anthropology.