Tug of War: The Heterogeneous Effects of Outbidding Between Terrorist Groups

IF 8.2 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Casey Crisman-Cox, Michael Gibilisco
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We introduce a dynamic game of outbidding where two groups use violence to compete in a tug-of-war fashion for evolving public support. We fit the model to the canonical outbidding rivalry between Hamas and Fatah using newly collected data on Palestinian public support for these groups. Competition has heterogeneous effects, and we demonstrate that intergroup competition can discourage violence. Competition from Hamas leads Fatah to use more terrorism than it would in a world where Hamas abstains from terrorism, but competition from Fatah can lead Hamas to attack less than it otherwise would. Likewise, making Hamas more capable or interested in competing increases overall violence, but making Fatah more capable or interested discourages violence on both sides. These discouragement effects of competition on violence emerge through an asymmetric contest, in which we find that Fatah uses terrorism more effectively to boost its support, although Hamas has lower attack costs. Expanding on these results, we demonstrate that outbidding theory is consistent with a positive, negative, or null relationship between measures of violence and incentives to compete.

拔河:恐怖组织竞标的异质效应
我们引入了一个动态的竞标游戏,其中两个团体使用暴力以拔河的方式竞争公众的支持。我们利用新收集的巴勒斯坦公众对哈马斯和法塔赫的支持数据,将模型与典型的竞标竞争相匹配。竞争具有异质性效应,我们证明了群体间竞争可以抑制暴力。​同样,让哈马斯更有能力或更有兴趣参与竞争会增加整体暴力,但让法塔赫更有能力或更感兴趣会抑制双方的暴力。​在这些结果的基础上,我们证明了竞价理论与暴力措施与竞争激励之间的正、负或零关系是一致的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.50
自引率
1.30%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: International Organization (IO) is a prominent peer-reviewed journal that comprehensively covers the field of international affairs. Its subject areas encompass foreign policies, international relations, political economy, security policies, environmental disputes, regional integration, alliance patterns, conflict resolution, economic development, and international capital movements. Continuously ranked among the top journals in the field, IO does not publish book reviews but instead features high-quality review essays that survey new developments, synthesize important ideas, and address key issues for future scholarship.
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