Unsung guardians? Communal fraud susceptibility and complaints following mass financial adviser attrition

Natalie Y.N. Oh, Jerry T. Parwada, Eugene Wang
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Abstract

This paper illustrates lesser-known positive impacts of financial advisers on communal fraud susceptibility. The analysis focuses on the unprecedented scale of adviser departures triggered by heightened educational and ethics requirements recently introduced in the Australian financial planning industry. We exploit this quasi-experimental setting of mass exits from the wealth management industry to show the removal of professional financial advice increases fraud in affected localities. Areas having proportionately more advisers with membership in professional associations register fewer cases of fraud. Other adviser heterogeneities, including higher education qualifications, do not discernibly reduce fraud pervasiveness or consumer complaints.
无名监护人吗?集体欺诈易感性和大规模财务顾问流失后的投诉
本文阐述了鲜为人知的财务顾问对公共欺诈敏感性的积极影响。这项分析的重点是,由于澳大利亚金融规划行业最近提高了教育和道德要求,导致顾问离职的规模空前。我们利用这种大规模退出财富管理行业的准实验设置来表明,在受影响的地区,取消专业金融建议会增加欺诈行为。具有专业协会会员资格的顾问比例较高的地区登记的欺诈案件较少。其他顾问的异质性,包括高等教育资格,并没有明显减少欺诈的普遍性或消费者投诉。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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