From the executive suite to the environment: How does CEO power affect climate change disclosures?

IF 5.4 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI:10.1016/j.intfin.2025.102140

Sudipta Bose , Sabri Boubaker , Hussein Daradkeh , Syed Shams

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between CEO power and corporate climate change disclosure and the moderating role of internal and external monitoring in this relationship. Using a sample of 3,512 United States firm-year observations, we find that firms with more powerful CEOs disclose less climate change information. However, this negative relationship is mitigated in firms with higher institutional ownership, greater financial analyst coverage, and stronger internal governance. Our results remain robust across a series of tests designed to address both observable and unobservable selection biases, as well as omitted variable biases. Further analysis reveals that reduced firm-level transparency is an underlying channel through which CEO power diminishes climate change disclosures. Additionally, we document that climate change disclosure acts as an underlying mechanism linking CEO power to firm value. The findings of our study have important implications for regulators, policymakers, researchers, investors, analysts, and company management, especially in the context of increasing regulatory pressure on firms to enhance their climate change disclosures.

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本研究探讨了首席执行官权力与企业气候变化信息披露之间的关系，以及内部和外部监督在这种关系中的调节作用。通过对 3,512 个美国公司年度观测数据的抽样调查，我们发现首席执行官权力较大的公司披露的气候变化信息较少。然而，在机构持股比例较高、金融分析师覆盖面较大以及内部治理较强的公司中，这种负面关系得到了缓解。我们的结果在一系列旨在解决可观察和不可观察的选择偏差以及遗漏变量偏差的测试中保持稳健。进一步的分析表明，公司层面透明度的降低是首席执行官权力削弱气候变化信息披露的一个潜在渠道。此外，我们还发现，气候变化信息披露是将首席执行官权力与公司价值联系起来的潜在机制。我们的研究结果对监管机构、政策制定者、研究人员、投资者、分析师和公司管理层都有重要的启示，尤其是在监管机构要求公司加强气候变化信息披露的压力越来越大的情况下。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money Multiple-

CiteScore

6.60

自引率

10.00%

发文量

142

期刊介绍： International trade, financing and investments, and the related cash and credit transactions, have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years. The international monetary system has continued to evolve to accommodate the need for foreign-currency denominated transactions and in the process has provided opportunities for its ongoing observation and study. The purpose of the Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the international aspects of financial markets, institutions and money. Theoretical/conceptual and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • International financial markets • International securities markets • Foreign exchange markets • Eurocurrency markets • International syndications • Term structures of Eurocurrency rates • Determination of exchange rates • Information, speculation and parity • Forward rates and swaps • International payment mechanisms • International commercial banking; • International investment banking • Central bank intervention • International monetary systems • Balance of payments.