Rule-following, I-we sociality, and solitary language

Abstract

The commentary focuses on McDowell’s understanding of rule-following and language use, to which Cheng is explicitly sympathetic. According to McDowell, Wittgenstein’s discussions of following a rule imply that rule-following is social, that is, dependent upon interaction with other people. But Wittgenstein seems to allow the possibility of solitary rule-following. McDowell’s main reason for insisting on the sociality of rule-following is that following a rule is linguistic and language use is essentially social. But Wittgenstein’s relevant remarks seem to allow the possibility of non-linguistic rule-following, which leaves room for the possibility of non-linguistic solitary rule-following. It can be objected that, despite the possibility of non-linguistic solitary rule-following, linguistic rule-following is essentially social, for the reason that language is essentially social. But there seems to be no further reason to insist on the sociality of language, if the possibility of solitary rule-following is allowed. Moreover, pace McDowell, the Gadamerian conception of I-we sociality seems to be congenial to the possibility of solitary language, which in turn supports the possibility of solitary linguistic rule-following.