{"title":"A Hardware-Friendly Shuffling Countermeasure Against Side-Channel Attacks for Kyber","authors":"Dejun Xu;Kai Wang;Jing Tian","doi":"10.1109/TCSII.2025.3528751","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"CRYSTALS-Kyber has been standardized as the only key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) scheme by NIST to withstand attacks by large-scale quantum computers. However, the side-channel attacks (SCAs) on its implementation are still needed to be well considered for the upcoming migration. In this brief, we propose a secure and efficient hardware implementation for Kyber by incorporating a novel compact shuffling architecture. First of all, we modify the Fisher-Yates shuffle to make it more hardware-friendly. We then design an optimized shuffling architecture for the well-known open-source Kyber hardware implementation to enhance the security of all known and potential side-channel leakage points. Finally, we implement the modified Kyber design on FPGA and evaluate its security and performance. The security is verified by conducting correlation power analysis (CPA) and test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) on the hardware. Meanwhile, FPGA place-and-route results show that the proposed design reports only 8.7% degradation on the hardware efficiency compared with the original unprotected version, much better than existing hardware hiding schemes.","PeriodicalId":13101,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs","volume":"72 3","pages":"504-508"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10839120/","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
CRYSTALS-Kyber has been standardized as the only key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) scheme by NIST to withstand attacks by large-scale quantum computers. However, the side-channel attacks (SCAs) on its implementation are still needed to be well considered for the upcoming migration. In this brief, we propose a secure and efficient hardware implementation for Kyber by incorporating a novel compact shuffling architecture. First of all, we modify the Fisher-Yates shuffle to make it more hardware-friendly. We then design an optimized shuffling architecture for the well-known open-source Kyber hardware implementation to enhance the security of all known and potential side-channel leakage points. Finally, we implement the modified Kyber design on FPGA and evaluate its security and performance. The security is verified by conducting correlation power analysis (CPA) and test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) on the hardware. Meanwhile, FPGA place-and-route results show that the proposed design reports only 8.7% degradation on the hardware efficiency compared with the original unprotected version, much better than existing hardware hiding schemes.
期刊介绍:
TCAS II publishes brief papers in the field specified by the theory, analysis, design, and practical implementations of circuits, and the application of circuit techniques to systems and to signal processing. Included is the whole spectrum from basic scientific theory to industrial applications. The field of interest covered includes:
Circuits: Analog, Digital and Mixed Signal Circuits and Systems
Nonlinear Circuits and Systems, Integrated Sensors, MEMS and Systems on Chip, Nanoscale Circuits and Systems, Optoelectronic
Circuits and Systems, Power Electronics and Systems
Software for Analog-and-Logic Circuits and Systems
Control aspects of Circuits and Systems.