Game theory applications in managing stakeholder conflicts for building safety and resilience against natural disasters

Abstract

The safety and resilience of buildings and housing against natural disasters, as a key urban element, are vital for sustainable development. Ensuring the safety and resilience of buildings and communities in the face of disasters is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. This challenge not only encompasses various economic, social, engineering, and legal dimensions but also requires the collaboration of diverse stakeholders with differing interests and objectives. However, conflicts between relevant players and stakeholders can hinder progress and jeopardize the goal of building safety and resilience, ultimately threatening the sustainability of communities. The management of housing safety and resilience systems requires a deep understanding of stakeholder behavior and conflicts among them. Even when stakeholders seek mutual benefits, their actions can sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes for all involved parties. Game theory provides an analytical framework for examining and interpreting the actions of stakeholders related to the safety and resilience of buildings and housing. It highlights how interactions among different parties, who may prioritize personal goals over broader system objectives, can influence the system's evolution and outcomes. The outcomes obtained through game theory often contrast with those proposed by optimization approaches, which typically assume that all parties are fully aligned in their commitment to achieving the best possible outcome for the system as a whole. The present study examines the application of game theory to analyze the behavior of key actors involved in the urban housing construction process, identify existing conflicts, and explore their impact on the resilience and safety of buildings in developing countries facing natural disasters. By analyzing the dynamic and complex structure of safety and resilience challenges, the study underscores the importance of considering stakeholder attitudes and the game's evolutionary trajectory in addressing these issues. Furthermore, it introduces a game between engineers and investors to demonstrate how the personal goals of involved parties can foster opportunistic behaviors that compromise the safety and resilience of buildings. Ultimately, the study argues that game theory can serve as an effective tool for understanding stakeholder behavior, addressing conflicts, and enhancing collaboration among stakeholders. This approach offers valuable insights for policymakers aiming to achieve safer and more resilient urban systems.